Abstract -The risk of having a program execution corrupted by transient faults is growing as computer processors are using more transistors, are becoming denser and are operating at lower voltages. This risk is multiplied when we take into account High Performance Computing with its hundreds or thousands of processors working together to solve a single problem. To evaluate how program executions behave in presence of transient faults we have proposed the concept of robustness against transient faults. This concept can be used to determine the more significant parts of a program with respect to the risk of misbehavior by transient faults for further study of improvement. The robustness concept can also be used as a metric to compare different approaches applied to a program to make it less likely of producing corrupted results. In this work we present why and how is possible to simplify a fraction of a program's robustness by taking into account the repetition of sequences of instructions. The simplified analysis obtains the exact same result as a full program robustness evaluation (exhaustively and without estimations). By simplifying the analysis we were able to reduce in up to 192 times our previously published robustness analysis time and also were able to evaluate larger programs in feasible time (unimaginable by using executions in a fault injection capable environment).
INTRODUCTION
The ever growing die density of computer processors is one of the great factors of the astonishing improvements in processing power of the last decades. Computer chips are using smaller components, having more transistors, using those transistors with higher density and also operating at lower voltage. The side effect of such a scenario is that processors are less robust than ever against transient faults [1] .
Transient faults are those faults that might occur only once in a system lifetime and never happen again the same way. Transient faults in computer systems may occur in processors, memory, internal buses and devices, often resulting in an inversion of a bit state (i.e. single bit flip) on the faulty location [2] . Cosmic radiation, high operating temperature and variations in the power supply subsystem are the most common cause of transient faults in computer systems.
A transient fault may cause a program to misbehave (e.g. write into an invalid memory position; attempt to execute an inexistent instruction). Such misbehaved applications will then be abruptly interrupted by the operating system fail-stop mechanism.
Nevertheless, an undetected data corruption is the biggest risk for a program execution. It happens when the bit flipped by the transient fault produces an incorrect final result that might be never noticed.
The errors that can be noticed by the effects of transient faults are called soft errors.
Let's consider a program robustness against transient faults as the ability of this program, once executed in a given computer architecture, to present a result without corruption or, in the case of detecting a transient fault, stop the program execution preventing returning corrupt results to the user [3] .
A program or its execution environment (libraries, operating system and even the computer architecture) may implement resources to minimize the effects of the transient faults in the program execution. These resources will, then, increase the program robustness against transient faults.
The most common method for evaluating a program robustness against transient faults is to run the program for a given amount of times in a fault injection environment, injecting only one fault (randomly chosen) per execution, and measuring how often the program will fail. This method can be very time consuming and also will not evaluate the whole program execution. In section II we present some alternatives proposed to avoid or reduce the amount of fault injections needed to evaluate a program robustness.
Also, in section II we briefly describe our method of evaluating a program robustness against transient faults exhaustively, precisely and in a time considerably lower than using executions with fault injection [3] .
In this work we present a significant improvement of our methodology with a method to simplify fractions of the robustness based on identical repetition of sequences of instructions. This simplification allowed us to reduce the time to evaluate a program robustness by almost 192 times in comparison with our previously published work [3] . Another benefit of using the simplification in the analysis is that it allowed us to evaluate programs with larger workloads and larger execution times than before in feasible time.
In section III we explain the simplification method and also present an analytical proof of why is possible to make such simplification without affecting the calculated robustness of a program execution or its exhaustiveness or precision.
Our experimental evaluation with a set of benchmarks designed for parallel programs is presented in section IV, and in section V we state our conclusions for this work.
II. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
Using fault injections to evaluate a program robustness against transient fault can be a very time consuming task. Some work that evaluated program's robustness using only fault injections suggested about 5,000 execution for each program evaluated [4] , or 2,000 executions for each program evaluated [5] . These executions are considerably slower than executing the program in a fault free environment because of the overhead of the fault injection environment (simulators or dynamic instrumentation).
The need for some way to evaluate the behavior of a program execution against transient faults without taking into account detailed processor architecture information inspired some software-only based evaluation tools and methodologies.
These software only based evaluations could be performed by ordinary users and developers without access to advanced hardware resources or simulators, easing the evaluation of the reliability of their programs against transient faults.
Program Vulnerability Factor (PVF) was proposed in [6] to adapt the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) proposed in [7] to a software only based metric for the effects of transient faults into program executions.
PVF [6] and robustness against transient faults [3] are very similar, but opposites by concept. Where PVF quantifies the amount of vulnerabilities of a program, robustness quantifies the portions of program executions that cannot be affected by a transient fault. As metrics, a program robustness is equivalent to the inverse of the same program PVF (1).
Robustness = ଵ
However, the PVF evaluation presented by the authors of [6] used simulators and samples of program executions, still estimating part of the PVF for the evaluated programs.
Evaluating the PVF concept, the authors of [8] found some limitations with the implementation of practical tools to calculate a program PVF. Because of these limitations, they only evaluated one program compiled for the x86 processor architecture with about 3.7 millions of instructions executed.
However, the comparison of the results of their limited PVF/robustness evaluation with an exhaustive fault injection campaign demonstrated that these software based concepts may serve as a starting point for estimating the vulnerability of programs against transient faults.
In [9] and [10] the authors present a comprehensive work about pruning techniques to reduce the amount of fault injections experiments needed to evaluate a program robustness against transient faults.
Although using fault injection in very specific portions of the evaluated programs, their experimental evaluation presented some limitations by not taking into account dynamic linked libraries or float point registers.
As our main concern is about High Performance Computing, we already have a parallel program evaluation extension of our robustness methodology, but this extension will not be presented in the scope of this work about saving time in a program robustness evaluation.
A. Our Current Proposed Methodology
Our proposal to evaluate program robustness against transient faults [3] is based on the analysis of a trace of the program execution.
The key differences between our proposal and the others described previously in this work are:
x Evaluation of the whole program execution exhaustively, calculating the robustness on every instruction executed by the program being evaluated; x Evaluation of all processor architecture registers (both integers and floating point); x The robustness calculation is precise without any kind of statistical approximation or estimation (for one program trace there will be only one robustness precisely calculated). Our evaluation is divided in two steps: the trace generation and the trace analysis. There is no way of doing the evaluation in only one step. This is because the second step (trace analysis) depends on all data generated in the first step (trace generation) but will evaluate its contents backwards (from the last generated data to the first generated data), as shown in the top of Fig. 1 .
1) Trace Generation
The trace generation step comprehends all activities of the methodology regarding obtaining program information to perform the analysis.
From the methodology point of view, the trace generation should log all instructions executed by the program in a single trace. This trace should have all instructions executed by the program in the order they were executed.
From the implementation point of view, the trace generation logs all basic blocks executed by the program being evaluated in the order they are executed and also logs all instructions executed in each basic block.
In the implemented trace generation tool we divided the trace information in two distinct files: the basic block information (BBI) file and the packed basic block (PBB) sequences file, as shown in Fig. 1 .
The BBI file has detailed information about all basic blocks: the address of the basic block in memory, the amount of instructions the basic block has, how many times during trace generation the basic block was executed and detailed information about its instructions. The basic block information file size is proportional to the amount of unique basic blocks recognized during the trace generation.
The current implemented trace generation tool stores all information about how the instructions affect the registers in the BBI file instead of having this information statically in some kind of processor architecture information table. Fortunately, the dynamic instrumentation tool (PIN [11] ) we used to develop our trace generation tool has in its API ways to analyze instructions and collect information about read and written registers.
Once having all instructions information in the BBI file, our tool saves all basic blocks executed by the program during the trace generation in the order they have been executed in the PBB file.
The very first implementation of the trace generation tool didn't perform any kind of compression in the PBB file. But, once we started generating traces of program executions we noticed that a very small program could have tens of millions of basic blocks executions, and small programs might have billions of basic blocks executions. These amounts grew as the evaluated programs executed for more time (with larger workloads).
We implemented an on-the-fly simple compression algorithm in our trace generation tool trying to avoid huge files with the basic block sequences executed.
The implemented compression algorithm creates buffers to store sequences of identifiers for each compression level.
At each compression level, as the basic blocks are executed, the identifier of the basic block (for the first compression level) or the identifier of the sequence of basic blocks from the lower compression level are stored in a buffer until an identifier lower than the last stored one arrives. Finding a jump to a lower sequence identifier triggers the delimitation of a single sequence.
The compression algorithm will then seek for the current buffered sequence in the list of known sequences. If it finds a match, it will store only the matched sequence identifier (and not the whole sequence information) in the upper compression level. If it didn't find a match, it will store the buffered sequence as a new sequence in the list of known sequences. Then, the compression algorithm will clean the current buffer and will let the trace generation keep running.
Also, when a sequence happen to occur repeatedly (mostly in loops at the program execution), the compression algorithm will put only one occurrence of the sequence identifier on the PBB file and will also put a counter with the amount of times that the sequences repeated itself.
In Fig. 1 we have a sample of a hypothetical packed basic block sequence trace with two levels of compression. There are cases of repetition in both presented compression levels: of a sequence of basic blocks in compression level one and of basic blocks in compression level zero.
2) Trace Analysis
The trace analysis step uses all architecture information (about its instructions and how the instructions affects the architecture registers) and the trace of the program execution to evaluate the program robustness against transient faults.
From the methodology point of view, the trace analysis must evaluate every instruction executed by the program in the inverse order they were executed, calculating the robust state for all architecture registers bits and storing the amount of bits considered robust to inform the whole program robustness.
In the implemented trace analysis tool we first read the BBI file and create a table with all basic blocks instructions and affected registers (both by reading and writing).
After finishing reading the BBI file, the analysis tool reads the PBB file, storing the sequences information in memory. Once finished reading the PBB file, the analysis begins by replacing recursively the sequences of the higher compression levels by sequences of lower compression levels until arriving at a basic block unit, when it performs the robustness evaluation for the basic block instructions.
III. SIMPLIFICATION
The idea of using some kind of simplification during the analysis step started when we were doing proofs of concept of our methodology with architectures and programs simple enough to allow running the whole methodology (both the trace generation and the analysis step) by hand. We noticed that, once in a loop, where a sequence of instructions are repeated a given amount of times, there were a coincidence in the robustness evaluated for the set of instruction of the sequence in all the repetitions except the first analyzed.
So we supposed that, if we could prove that this coincidence was in fact a simplification, it could be done without affecting two of our methodology characteristics (exhaustiveness and precision) reducing significantly the amount of time needed to perform the robustness evaluation.
A. Analytical Proof
Even noticing the potential of the coincidence in some proof of concept evaluations and trace analyses, we studied the simplification using our analytical definition of the robustness [3] in order to prove that we could really simplify some parts of the robustness evaluation without affecting the precision or the exhaustiveness of the evaluation, key characteristics of our methodology.
In our methodology, the robustness against transient faults of a program prog, when executed over an architecture A (1), is the sum of the bits tagged as active (f abits ) of the robust states (f rstate ) of all architecture registers r in all executed instructions n present in the trace Trace prog×A divided by the amount of instructions (nins) of the trace Trace prog×A multiplied by the sum of the architecture A registers r size (f RegSize ) [3] .
One of the key concepts of the robustness evaluation using our methodology is (2) the robust state f rstate function of an architecture A register reg in a given point n of a program prog trace execution Trace prog×A .
This function needs three things to be evaluated. The first is the robust state of the register reg in the previously evaluated trace point (the next instruction in the execution trace as the analysis is performed backwards). Also, the f rstate function need to know the bits that the instruction i at the point n in the execution trace Trace prog×A reads (read operation, f rbits ) and writes (write operation, f wbits ) to perform its operation.
1) Single Instruction Repetition Sequence
Consider a program execution trace over a given architecture with n executed instructions. Consider also that this trace has a sequence with the instruction i 1 that is repeated k times, with its last repetition at the trace point x. Fig. 2 shows a sample of the considered trace.
For the instruction evaluated just before the beginning of the sequence with the repetition (trace point x+1), we have (3):
So, for the first instruction i 1 evaluated (the last executed of the sequence) we can calculate its robust state (4) based on the robust state s x+1 , as follows:
Then, to the second instruction i 1 evaluated we can calculate its robust state (5) based on the robust state s x of the first instruction i 1 of the sequence, as follows:
The robust state s x-1 for the second occurrence of the instruction i 1 of the sequence, once calculated (5), resulted to be the same as the first evaluated one (s x ).This happened because both evaluations were done with the same instruction i 1 , and so used the same f wbits and f rbits , what lead to an absorption of the redundant items in the equation.
Indeed, for the third instruction i 1 evaluated (6), as for all the rest of them until the trace point x-(k-1), all robust states will be the same as the first occurrence of i 1 .
2) Many Distinct Instructions Repetition Sequence
Consider now another program execution trace over a given architecture with n executed instructions.
Consider also that this trace has a sequence with two distinct instructions i 1 and i 2 that are repeated k times, with the last repetition of the instruction i 1 at the trace point x. Fig. 3 shows a sample of the considered trace.
Beginning with the same assumptions of the previously evaluated scenario, for the first occurrences of i 1 (7) and i 2 (8) we have two write them as functions of the s x+1 robust state presented in (3), as follows: In the second occurrence of the first instruction evaluated i 1 (9) it wasn't possible to simplify its robust state yet because there was no way to reduce it more until finding something we've already calculated.
However, we could write the second instruction evaluated i 2 (10) as a function of the last instruction evaluated before the sequence, with the same formula as its first occurrence.
This behavior is slightly different of the repetition of only one instruction in the previously presented example, and will not allow us to simplify the robust states of the first occurrence of the repetition in the rest of the occurrences.
Starting in the third occurrence of i 1 (11) and i 2 (12) , all the instructions present in the repetition can be simplified, as follows: 
With all these analyses we proved that, for a given sequence of instructions that repeats itself a given amount of times, we can use the result obtained in the calculation of the first two sequences analyzed to simplify the robust state (and so, the robustness) of all the rest of the occurrences of the sequence.
B. Key Factors in the Implementation
In order to exploit the potential of the simplification we needed to observe and recognize patterns where sequences of instructions repeated themselves in a program trace.
Fortunately, our trace compression algorithm performed such recognition during the trace generation step with the basic blocks. Also, our trace compression algorithm stored the repetition information in the PBB file.
In this way, our trace generation tool needed no further modification in order to collect more information to help possible simplifications during the analysis step. All the information about repetitions of sequences of basic blocks (and their instructions) was already in the trace because of our goal of saving disk space.
The only modification we did in our robustness analysis tool was, once recognizing repetition information on the evaluated PBB trace, if the repetition was performed for more than two times, to cache all the information about the second iteration of the repetition and to multiply this cached information by the amount of times left to perform the evaluation of the whole set of iterations. Fig. 4 shows an example of a trace analysis using simplification.
In the example, we have a hypothetical trace with two potential simplification points. One in the basic block sequence B0 at compression level one with four repetitions of the basic block sequence A1 and other in the basic block sequence A0 with four repetitions of the basic block BB4.
As the trace analysis starts at the basic block sequence B0, the analysis program will calculate the robust state for all architecture registers at basic blocks BB7 and BB2 (basic block sequence A2).
Then, the analysis program will find the repetition pattern of the basic block sequence A1 and it will perform the first iteration of this repetition. It will calculate the robust state for the basic block BB5 and will find another repetition sequence (now for the basic block BB4). As the program performs the analysis recursively, there is no problem of having a sequence being simplified inside other simplification.
The trace analysis will perform the analysis of the first occurrence of BB4, will perform and cache the analysis of the second occurrence of BB4 and will simplify the cached result by two times.
After this, the analysis program will calculate the robust state for basic block BB3 and will finish the first occurrence of the basic block sequence A1.
For the second occurrence of the basic block sequence A1, the trace program will cache the evaluation of BB5, of BB4 (with its own simplification) and BB3. Then, the analysis program will simplify the cached result by two times and will finish the evaluation by calculating the robust state of the basic block sequence A0 (basic blocks BB6, BB2, BB1 and BB0).
This implementation (as the simplification concept presented for our methodology supposes) will generate for a given program trace the exactly same result for the robustness evaluation as the program analysis without simplification, but it may reduce significantly the time needed to perform the robustness analysis against transient fault of a given program trace.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
For this work we calculated the robustness against transient faults of nine programs, with five distinct workloads each, using our methodology and tools with and without simplification. The selected programs are part of the NAS Parallel Benchmark (NPB) [12] in its version 3.3.1. We selected to evaluate the serial versions of Block Tri-diagonal solver (BT), Conjugate Gradient (CG), Embarrassingly Parallel (EP), discrete 3D fast Fourier Transform (FT), Integer Sort (IS), Lower-Upper Gauss-Seidel solver (LU), Multi-Grid on a sequence of meshes (MG), Scalar Penta-diagonal solver (SP) and Unstructured Adaptive mesh (UA) benchmarks with their S, W, A, B and C classes [13] .
In comparison with our previously published work, where we evaluated only the S class of five benchmarks (BT, CG, FT, LU and SP), we are scaling our robustness analysis from programs that execute in tents of seconds (0.16 on average) to programs that execute in hundreds of seconds (683.47 on average).
All nine benchmark programs used in this experimental work were compiled using GNU C and Fortran in their version 4.4.6, with maximum code optimization during compilation (O3).
All the computing nodes used in this set of experiments have CentOS version 6 operating system with 64 bits kernel version 2.6.32. The hardware of all computing nodes used in this work has eight 1.6 GHz AMD Opteron processors with eight cores each and 256 gigabytes of RAM. Table I show a summary of the numbers we obtained with this set of experiments. The table contains: the program used in the evaluation (Benchmark), the workload used in the evaluation (Class), the standard program execution time without any kind of interference (Execution Time), how much time took to generate the traces (Trace Generation Time), the size of the basic block information trace file (BBI File Size), the amount of unique basic blocks recognized by the trace generator (Unique Basic Blocks), the size of the packed basic block sequences file (PBB File Size), the total amount of instructions that were traced during the trace generation step (Instructions Executed), the percentage of the instructions that were executed by the program and not by some library (Program Influence), the robustness calculated (Robustness), the time spent on the robustness analysis without simplification (Analysis Time Without Simplification), the time spent on the robustness analysis with simplification (Analysis Time With Simplification) and the amount of instructions that the analyses could simplify (Simplified Instructions).
A. Simplification
All the evaluated programs in this set of experiments were very predictable, with exception for the EP and UA benchmarks. This "unpredictability" is reflected directly in the efficiency of the compression we obtained during the PBB file generation by recognizing repetitive sequence patterns of basic blocks. Fig. 5 shows the relation between workloads and the amount of instructions executed and simplified. The optimal behavior of a program for our simplification purposes are presented in BT, IS, LU and SP charts. These programs, once scaling out the workload, have a significant increase in the instructions executed, but the increase in the amount of instructions analyzed keep always around one. This means that the analysis time for these programs with simplification is almost constant, even with larger workloads, as showed in Table I. A non-optimal but very good behavior of programs for our simplification purposes were obtained with CG, FT and MG programs. They kept increasing the amount of executed instructions more than increasing the amount of analyzed instructions. This means that the benefit of simplification is better for larger workloads.
The EP program presented an equal increase in the amount of instructions executed and in the amount of instructions analyzed. In this case, the benefit of simplification has a constant proportion with the amount of instructions executed (around 8.7%) as shown in Table I .
The worst scenario for our simplification is what we obtained with the UA program evaluation. The increase of the amount of instructions analyzed was greater than the increase of the amount of instructions executed. This means that we are losing simplification capacity for larger workloads.
Because of a limitation in our experimental environment allowing a program to run only up to three days, unfortunately, the accurate numbers about Class C EP and UA programs analyses with simplification are unavailable.
However, even in the worst cases presented in this set of experiments, the analysis time using simplification will always be equal or better the analysis time without simplification.
Also, in the worst result we obtained, the time needed to generate the program trace and analyze it without any simplification was equivalent to run the evaluated program for less than 2,800 times (1,880 times on average without simplification and 170 times on average with simplification). Our current analysis tool scored about 1.6 millions of instructions analyzed per second. This number can be used for predicting the analysis time without simplification once obtained the program trace. In fact, for all classes B and C presented in Table I , the numbers of the analysis time without simplification (with an *) were estimated.
B. Robustness
Fig . 6 shows the robustness evaluated of each program of this set of experiments with almost all the workloads proposed.
It is noticeable that the smaller workloads tend to present a robustness slightly different of those with the larger workloads. However, the standard deviation found between the smaller and the larger workloads were all lower than 3%.
This low deviation implies that we could evaluate the robustness of the smaller workloads to test the programs with fault detection and protection mechanisms. These evaluations with the smaller workload should test enough of the program/algorithm to the evaluation be considered valid also for the same program/algorithm with larger workloads.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Evaluate a program robustness against transient faults by using fault injection can be a very time consuming task to obtain only a statistical approximation of the desired result.
We presented in a previous work the concept of robustness against transient faults and a methodology to calculate this robustness based on information about the processor architecture and on an execution trace of the program running over the architecture.
In this work we presented a significant improvement of our methodology with a method to simplify some parts of the robustness evaluation, allowing us to reduce the time to evaluate program robustness against transient faults by almost 192 times in comparison with our previous work without compromising exhaustiveness or precision.
The use of the simplification in the robustness evaluation also allowed us evaluate programs with larger workloads (and larger execution time) than before.
With our experimental evaluation we noticed that for almost all cases evaluated there were no significant deviation (generally lower than 3%) of the robustness calculated when scaling out the programs workloads.
